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New security breaches in
Microsoft products are revealed with distressing regularity. Aside from
dealing with the concretes, this also raises more general issues: why is
Microsoft unable (or unwilling) to deal with these
security issues, and how should a small to medium firm that does not
have the resources to devote a part-time employee to security approach
this problem? Realistically, to what extent is a small firm actually at
risk?
Let us consider the specifics first. The
latest security issue is unique in that it does not involve a virus, but
an everyday feature of Word, the use of field codes. Word uses field
codes for a number of ordinary functions, such as setting the date, or
putting the name of a document in a footer so that it is printed with
the document. The issue is as follows: someone, sends you a document to
be edited. You open the document, edit it, print it, and return it to
the sender. Unbeknownst to you, "spy" field codes in the document have
inserted documents from your hard drive or server into the document or
sent them to a web site. The original sender has "stolen" some of your
documents, and there is no way for you to be aware of this. This exploit
was first revealed on August 26. To date, Microsoft has refused to
recognize the seriousness of this problem, although columnist Woody
Leonhard reports that its PR agency has sent an email to one journalist
claiming that a "fix" is in the works (not for Word 97, which Microsoft
no longer supports, though). More ways to use this particular field code
are being published every day and the potential damage it can do is
expanding apace. For example, it was originally thought that the sender
of the document had to know the exact name of the document he wanted to
steal, but that is no longer entirely true.
The easiest "fix" for this problem is to
obtain a free utility by Bill Coan, which you can run against any
document to see whether it contains a "spy" field. This is available at or
If you are already using Payne Consulting's Metadata Assistant, this
supposedly also incorporates a fix for this problem in its latest
release.
Will This Actually Happen to You?
This is a widely published exploit that does not
require any programming skills other than a moderately sophisticated
knowledge of Word. It is not and cannot be picked up by any virus
scanners because it is not a virus.
Therefore, any deal or case in which the
stakes are high enough poses a risk that someone will try to steal
sensitive documents. To some extent the question "how likely is it that
this will happen" is irrelevant, since it only takes a single instance
for you to lose a big case, be sued for malpractice, etc. Other types of
disaster are not very "likely" either, but you still have insurance to
protect you. In this case, the "insurance" is free: get the utility and
run it against every file sent to you by anyone outside your firm.
Other Security Issues
The risks posed by Word's track changes
function have been recognized for several years, and utilities exist to
eliminate the danger posed by metadata. This risk is quite serious and
actually happened in at least one instance I am aware of. If you open a
Word document that had tracked changes turned on using WordPerfect (or
any text editor), you see all the comments and changes. One firm
received a document written in Word, opened it with WordPerfect and
noted the following comment concerning one passage: "Jim, do you think
we can get away with this language." Needless to say, it was trivial for
the attorney who opened the document to say in the course of
negotiations, "now, you know I won't let you get away with that
language."
Again, utilities exist to minimize this
danger, and as a matter of policy, documents should never be sent out of
the firm without accepting all tracked changes. If you were really
paranoid, you could open every Word document in WordPerfect before you send it out into the world to make sure it is safe.
Internet Explorer
Internet Explorer occupies a special place in the
pantheon of security risks because it is so tightly integrated into
Windows (can you say "antitrust"?.....). In addition to Microsoft
products, other software programs are increasingly requiring that
Internet Explorer must be installed, even if you don't use it (e.g., PC
Law, Amicus Attorney, Summation, and others). IE security breaches will
affect you even if you don't use it.
Therefore it is critical to keep IE updated.
Unfortunately, Microsoft's "critical" updates are not always reliable
and in some cases can lead to re-opening old security holes. A Microsoft
knowledge base article notes that one "fix" is to tell IE not to trust
content from Microsoft! This gives you control over what you install. To
do this, in IE, click Tools | Internet Options | Content. In the
Certificates section click Publishers | Trusted Publishers. If Microsoft
is listed, click on it and click Remove. In the future, as Microsoft
implements its new license provisions that allow it to change the
configuration of your PC
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without letting you know about it, this will
be even more important. You may also want to disable the auto-update
"feature" in WindowsXP . To do this, go to Control Panel | Administrative Tools | Services and change Auto-Update to manual.
Outlook Issues
The two main ways that viruses spread at the
present time are through Internet Explorer and Outlook. Microsoft's
response to these issues has been to lock down Outlook through a
draconian security patch that serious inhibits Outlook's ability to
integrate with third-party programs such as the PalmPilot. You now have
to tell Outlook that you do want to do the link and for a maximum of 10
minutes.
If you are using Outlook with Exchange
Server, there is a patch that enables an administrator to disable this
warning. If you are using Office XP, you might want to get Ken Slovak's
utility that lets you selectively re-enable options that Outlook outlaws
en masse. See .
The standard methods of protecting against
virus infection (in addition to an anti-virus program that is updated
very often) have been 1) to close the viewer pane in Outlook; 2) never
to open an attachment that you are not expecting to receive.
However, with the spread of viruses through
IE-related holes, this is no longer sufficient. Even more serious, the
newest viruses spread by sending themselves to everyone on your e-mail
list. Thus you can receive a virus in what appears to be an e-mail from
someone you know.
In response to all these issues, an entire
cottage industry has grown up to remedy the security problems with
Microsoft products. Two of the best sources are Woody Leonhard's
"Woody's Watch" site () and his various newsletters, and Sue Mosher's Outlook site, Slipstick, at . These are worth checking regularly.
Why Doesn't Microsoft Fix It?
The obvious question is: why can't (or won't)
Microsoft fix all these problems? Until recently, Microsoft's main
stress was on "ease of use." Since this ease of use was implemented
through the same procedures used by virus writers, Microsoft regarded
its security holes as features or assets rather than as problems. More
recently, Bill Gates announced his goal of providing "trustworthy
computing." Aside from whether or not you can take Microsoft
pronouncements as good coin, there is a serious structural problem here.
To truly eliminate the rampant security breaches, the basic code of
Windows and other Microsoft products will have to be re-written from
scratch and will almost certainly be incompatible with all previous
versions. This is not only a massive undertaking, but likely to engender
the major problem that all previous versions of any software you use
will no longer work. In short, implementing "trustworthy computing"
impinges on Microsoft's ability to maximize its profits, and is
therefore not likely to happen.
What Is Realistic?
It is safe to say that a firm which does not
require login-passwords is unlikely to take a serious approach to
protecting its documents from intrusion on the grounds that "it's too
much work." There is a realistic core to this argument: it is too much
work for a small firm in the sense that a serious approach to security
would require devoting a at least a part-time staff member to it. Yes,
you can do this yourself on a haphazard basis, but remember Red Adair's
adage: "if you think hiring a professional is expensive, try using an
amateur."
Rather than simply ignore the issue, firms
might consider hiring a consultant to come in on a regular basis - say, a
half-day a month - and go over all new security issues as they pertain
to the firm. This could also be an occasion to increase user awareness
(there is no substitute for on-going security and anti-virus training).
In addition, the consultant could be "on retainer" so that you get a
priority response in the event of a particularly serious new virus
attack, or the actual infection of your system. In short, take the
"retainer" approach that is similar to the way attorneys deal with
having experts or other attorneys specialized in certain areas "on call"
so that you know they will be available when needed.
Five Years of Computer News
This issue marks the fifth anniversary of
Computer News for Law Firms. Many of our articles have been syndicated
via the Technolawyer network and reprinted in publications reaching
hundreds of thousands of readers. Past articles are posted on the
Heckman Consulting web site at www. heckmanco.com. Some are outdated,
but those on general topics such as why use Case or Document Management
programs still read well.
John Heckman is president of Heckman
Counsulting, specializing in software integration for law firms, and is a
frequent contributor to dacs.doc. You can reach John at
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